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Dr. Kaur  
Mr. Bissell  
DDAI (NSC) FN Johnson file

23 December 1957

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting, 23 December 1957, 10:30 a.m.

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3. DCI followed closely his memorandum on "Revision of Procedures for Presenting Intelligence" (attached) and at the outset in presenting this topic there were distributed to the members of the Council copies of the dry run prepared as of close of business on Friday, 20 December. The program was well received; helpfulness of graphics was stressed; brevity of presentation was considered most important; and full support for the DCI's program was given. It was made quite clear that in all matters of intelligence, the responsibility lay with the DCI and that his reports and publications would be looked upon as the authoritative source in this field. It was clearly brought out in the discussion that the proposed format was a starter and that suggestions for modification were in order. General Cutler at one point asked whether, with the issuance of the Central Intelligence Bulletin, the publications of the other departments and agencies would be terminated. It was clear from the discussion that specific matters of other agencies and departments would make it necessary for them to continue their present practice. While dropping Admiral Strauss by his office he commented that one of the best ways to get

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people to read the publications was to get back the first-delivered copy before releasing the second. This is, of course, a possible lever, but a difficult one to adhere to strictly.

4. DCI also presented a proposal (based on his notes of 23 December attached hereto) stressing the desirability for the preparation of net estimates on a broader scale than is now the case. Dr. Killian supported the concept as proposed by the DCI and the only other comment was made by General Twining, who said that the individual services from time to time themselves responded to requests for net estimates, to which he received the reply from the Chair that the matter called for a broader approach; that one of the problems in carrying this out, however, was to maintain proper security precautions on a limited must-know basis.

5. While there was no specific decision made on this proposal, it would appear that a Council minute might be desirable which would direct the SecDef, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the DCI to study the matter and make recommendations.

*J. W. [unclear] 57*

## REVISION OF PROCEDURES FOR PRESENTING INTELLIGENCE

1. Have felt it necessary to find more effective method of presenting intelligence to NSC members and top officials on "need to know" basis.
2. We shall continue to be faced with series of developing critical situations not only in political and economic fields but in developing scientific and technological confidence of Soviet bloc countries.
3. In past have carried out this function through the Daily Current Intelligence Bulletin, through National Estimates and special disseminations.
4. Out of the vast amount of information received from all quarters and sources and by all methods, essential to put together a synthesis of the important items in convenient readable form and on current daily basis. Under the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence has the duty of correlating and evaluating intelligence relating to the National Security and its dissemination under the direction of the NSC. I seek that direction.

5. Propose now to change form of Daily Current Intelligence Bulletin and bring in, on as fully a consultative basis as possible, intelligence officers of the Department of State, Army, Navy, Air Force and Joint Chiefs of Staff , as well as of the Atomic Energy Commission, Federal Bureau of Investigation, on matters of direct concern to them.

6. This Bulletin will contain on a couple of pages a brief digest of important developments; one-page back-up papers on the important items of intelligence. More stress than in the past will be given to scientific, technological, economic developments.

Bulletin will also contain references to significant intelligence reports disseminated separately in the previous reporting period (see page 9).

7. This format tentative, subject to test in the using.

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2. While CIA can prepare net estimates of where we stand vis-a-vis Soviet Union in certain fields, where USA position, matter of public record, i. e., Gross National Product, industrial, agricultural production, etc. Cannot give NSC a comparative picture in classified technological fields, such as missiles, aircraft, nuclear development, CIA not competent to pass on USA position in latter fields.

3. Hence, NSC does not have, currently and in important areas, a clear relative position of USA and Soviet bloc.

4. We have a Net Estimate made annually on the capability of the Soviet Union to inflict damage on the USA. This exercise not carried into other fields. (Refer to Johnson Committee briefing. My refusal to give any Net Estimates (questioning regarding ground-to-air missile production - Moscow to Washington).

5. Preparation of Net Estimates in such fields as aircraft ~~would~~ missiles, nuclear, would not involve anything like the difficulties of the Net Capabilities Estimate. Relatively informal procedures, constituted as among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, AEC, President's Scientific Advisor, etc., could possibly accomplish it.

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6. Felt justified in making this presentation in view of duty under law to make recommendations to NSC for coordination of intelligence activities relating to national security.

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